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RECENT CASES"
the applicant can show that no person will realize any gain or profit from
the operation of the organization; that an indefinite number of persons
will benefit from the use of the property; and that the property is used ex-
clusively for charitable purposes within the meaning of Salvation Army.
The Missouri Supreme Court over the years has demonstrated a tendency
to increase the class of exempt property, liberalizing their interpretation of
the statute. However, this class expansion has been modest and, when
compared with other states, the Missouri courts can be considered conser-
vative. The conservative approach manifests itself in the clear indication






In June, 1969, Hetty Park gave birth to a baby who lived only five
hours. The cause of death was determined to be polycystic kidney disease,
a fatal hereditary disease of such a nature that there exists a substantial
probability that any future baby of the same parents will be born with it.2
Park and her husband alleged that immediately after the death of this in-
fant they sought the advice of the defendant obstetricians, who advised
them that the chances of having any future baby with polycystic kidney
disease were "practically nil" inasmuch as the disease was not hereditary.
In reliance on the defendants' assurances, the plaintiffs conceived a second
child, which was delivered in July, 1970. Contrary to the defendants'
assurances, this child too was born with polycystic kidney disease. The
child survived for two and one-half years, and during her short lifespan en-
dured physical pain and suffering from polycystic kidneys as well as other
diseases.
members; until the plaintiff has paid the cost of its own entertainment,
and goes out and finds her, and hands her whatever it may have left in its
pocket.
1. Park v. Chessin, 60 App. Div. 2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977); modify-
ing 88 Misc. 2d 222, 387 N.Y.S.2d 204 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (dismissed the mental suf-
fering element of plaintiffs' claim).
2. 4A R. GRAY, ATTORNEY'S TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE 286.65 (1972).
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The parents brought a lawsuit on their own behalf claiming damages
for medical expenses, emotional distress, 3 and loss of the wife's services in-
cident to the birth and care of the second child. In addition, as the legal
representatives of the child, the parents brought suit to recover for the
child's physical pain and suffering.
The trial term of the Supreme Court of New York denied the defen-
dants' motion to dismiss, 4 and the appellate division affirmed and held
that both the parents and the child stated a cause of action.5
The Park case involves two similar yet distinct types of actions:
"wrongful life" and "wrongful birth." Although many courts have
employed the terms interchangeably, "wrongful life"6 will be used to
denote an action brought by a child claiming injury because of the failure
to prevent its birth, whereas "wrongful birth" will denote an action
brought by the parents or prior born children.7 As the two types of actions
have received considerably different treatment by the courts, it is impor-
tant to distinguish them. 8
Wrongful birth and wrongful life cases also differ from ordinary
prenatal tort cases. In wrongful birth and wrongful life cases it is not con-
tended that the defendant did or failed to do anything to cause the damag-
ed condition of the child, as in ordinary prenatal tort cases. Rather, the
allegation in wrongful birth or wrongful life suits is that the defendant's
negligence resulted in the birth of an infant who otherwise would not have
3. The appellate division granted defendant's motion to dismiss as to this
element of the plaintiffs cause of action. This limitation upon the proper
elements of recovery is based upon Howard v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 366
N.E.2d 64, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1977). In Howard parents sued a doctor for failing
to detect that their unborn child had Tay-Sachs disease. In dismissing the
parents' claim for mental anguish, the court treated them just as though they
were mere bystanders, and hence not within the "perimeter of liability." This
result was due to New York's strict limitations upon the negligent infliction of
mental suffering theory of recovery. Id. at 116, 366 N.E.2d at 68, 397 N.Y.S.2d
at 367, 368 (Cook, J., dissenting).
4. 88 Misc. 2d 222, 387 N.Y.S.2d 204 (1976).
5. 60 App. Div. 2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977).
6. The term "wrongful life" has its origin in Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App.
2d 240, 259, 190 N.E.2d 849, 858 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964). In
Zepeda the suit was brought by a child against his father for damages claimed by
reason of his illegitimate birth. See also Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 356
N.E.2d 496 (1976) (suit brought by the parents was not a suit for "wrongful life").
7. See Aronoff v. Snider, 292 So. 2d 419 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (prior
born children do not have a cause of action for the dilution of their interests by
virtue of the wrongful birth of a fourth child).
8. See Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976);
Karlsons v. Guerinot, 57 App. Div. 2d 73, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933 (1977); Dumer v.
Saint Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975). In each of these
cases the courts were faced with both wrongful life and wrongful birth claims. All
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been born. 9 Due to the different problems inherent in the wrongful birth
and wrongful life theories, this note will deal with them individually, look-
ing first at the wrongful birth cases, then at the more difficult problem of
wrongful life cases.
Wrongful birth cases have arisen in a number of different fact situa-
tions. Parents of defective children, who were ill advised of the risk of birth
defects, have brought suit claiming injury in that they would have aborted
the pregnancy10 or avoided conception had they been properly informed. 11
Conversely, parents of healthy, but unplanned, children have brought
suits against surgeons for negligently performing sterilizations, 12 against
doctors for negligently failing to diagnose pregnancy within a reasonable
time,13 and against pharmacists for negligently filling prescriptions for
oral contraceptives.' 4
The results plaintiffs have achieved in pursuing the wrongful birth
theory have been as varied as the fact situations under which such claims
arise. Some courts, particularly in the early cases, have flatly refused to
allow recovery on this theory. 15 Other courts have recognized the cause of
9. Comment, Howard v. Lecher: An Unreasonable Limitation on a Physi-
cian's Liability in a Wrongful Life Suit, 12 NEw ENGLAND L. REV. 819, 820
(1977).
10. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967); Karlsons v.
Guerinot, 57 App. Div. 2d 73, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933 (1977); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519
S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975); Dumer v. Saint Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233
N.W.2d 372 (1975). See also Stewart v. Long Island College Hosp., 58 Misc. 2d
432, 296 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1968), modified, 35 App. Div. 2d 531, 313 N.Y.S.2d 502
(1970), affd mem., 30 N.Y.2d 695, 283 N.E.2d 616, 332 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1972)(doctors refused to grant plaintiff an abortion). The continued validity of Stewart
is doubtful in light of Park.
11. Park v. Chessin, 88 Misc. 2d 222, 387 N.Y.S.2d 204 (1976), modfied,
60 App. Div. 2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977).
12. See generally Annot., 83 A.L.R.3d 15 (1978); Annot., 27 A.L.R.3d 906
(1969). Two cases have involved the birth of impaired children. LaPoint v.
Shirley, 409 F. Supp. 118 (W.D. Tex. 1976) (recovery related to defects denied
because birth of an abnormal child was not foreseeable at the time of the tubal
ligation); Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 356 N.E.2d 496 (1976) (due to
faulty tubal ligation mother gave birth to twins; one healthy and one deformed;
judgment for $462,500 affirmed).
13. Ziemba v. Sternberg, 45 App. Div. 2d 230, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1974)
(stated a cause of action); Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219
N.W.2d 242 (1974) (recovery denied); Annot., 83 A.L.R.3d 15, § 18 (1978).
14. Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971) (normal
tort recovery should be allowed).
15. Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934); Gleit-
many. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967); Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D.
& C.2d 41 (1957). Compare Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219
N.W.2d 242 (1974) (no cause of action for the wrongful birth of a healthy child)
with Dumer v. Saint Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975)(partial recovery recognized for wrongful birth of defective child). 3
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action, but limited the measure of damages,1 6 while some courts have
denied motions to dismiss without discussing damages.' 7 Although there
are still recent decisions denying recovery,' the trend appears to be
toward recognizing wrongful birth actions and allowing plaintiffs to
recover the normal measure of tort damages.1 9
The wrongful birth cause of action first appeared at a time when abor-
tions were illegal and birth control was frowned upon. Early decisions
often were influenced by considerations of whether sterilization was
16. Bishop v. Byrne, 265 F. Supp. 460 (S.D.W. Va. 1967) (wrongful birth
claim stated a cause of action for mother's physical pain and suffering, as well as
the costs of the birth); Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975) (cost of rais-
ing a healthy child could not be recovered; defendant conceded that pain and
suffering of the mother, medical expenses of pregnancy, cost of sterilization
operation and the loss of consortium were proper damages); Howard v. Lecher,
42 N.Y.2d 109, 366 N.E.2d 64, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1977) (parents can not recover
damages for their mental anguish caused by the wrongful birth of a defective
child); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975) (damages for the
wrongful birth of a defective child limited to the burden related solely to the
defective condition); Garwood v. Locke, 552 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977)
(cause of action for wrongful birth permits at least the recovery of the medical ex-
penses incident to the birth of a healthy child).
17. Jackson v. Anderson, 230 So.2d 503 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
18. Since January 22, 1973, the date Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) in-
validated statutes prohibiting abortion in the first trimester of pregnancy, there
have been six decisions denying a cause of action for wrongful birth. LaPoint v.
Shirley, 409 F. Supp. 118 (W.D. Tex. 1976); Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8
(Del. 1975) (recovery of the costs of rearing a healthy child was the sole issue);
Greenberg v. Kliot, 47 App. Div. 2d 765, 367 N.Y.S.2d 966 (1975); Clegg v.
Chase, 89 Misc. 2d 510, 391 N.Y.S.2d 966 (Sup. Ct. 1977); Terrell v. Garcia, 496
S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927 (1974) (recovery of
the costs of rearing a healthy child was the sole issue); Rieck v. Medical Protective
Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974). Greenberg and Clegg, however,
can no longer be considered valid authority in the light of Park v. Chessin, 60
App. Div. 2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977). Moreover, Riech has been limited by
the later decision of Dumer v. Saint Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233
N.W.2d 372 (1975) (allowing recovery in the case of a defective child), and
Terrell has been narrowly interpreted by two subsequent cases. Jacob v. Theimer,
519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1976) (allowing recovery in the case of a defective child);
Garwood v. Locke, 552 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977) (narrowly reading
Terrell as precluding only the recovery of the costs of rearing the child).
19. See Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976);
Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967); Anonymous
v. Hospital, 33 Conn. Supp. 126, 366 A.2d 204 (1976); Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich.
App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971); Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 356
N.E.2d 496 (1976); Betancourt v. Gaylor, 136 N.J. Super. 69, 344 A.2d 336
(1975); Park v. Chessin, 88 Misc. 2d 222, 387 N.Y.S.2d 204 (Sup. Ct. 1976),
modified, 60 App. Div. 2d 80,400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977) (denying only the mental
suffering claim of parents); Karlsons v. Guerinot, 57 App. Div. 2d 73, 394
N.Y.S.2d 933 (1977); Cox v. Stretton, 77 Misc. 2d 155,352 N.Y.S.2d 834 (Sup.
Ct. 1974). 4
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 1 [1979], Art. 15
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss1/15
RECENT CASES
against public policy2o or whether abortion was legally available. 2' The
difficulties with the law in this area have been compounded by the fact
that recent cases continue to rely on these earlier decisions without suffi-
ciently considering the continuing validity of their arguments or whether
they fit the fact situation before the court.
In the leading case of Gleitman v. Cosgrove,22 the parents of a
physically impaired child brought suit against their doctor for falsely ad-
vising them that rubella, which had been contracted by Mrs. Gleitman in
the first month of pregnancy, would have no effect at all upon their child.
The plaintiffs claimed that had they known of the risk of birth defects,
they would have aborted the pregnancy. In their complaint they asked the
court to award them damages for their mental suffering, as well as the cost
of rearing the child. In upholding the dismissal of the plaintiffs' com-
plaint, the court stated that public policy 23 and the difficulty of measuring
damages24 precluded recognition of a wrongful birth cause of action.
These two factors have been the major stumbling blocks which plaintiffs
have encountered in pressing forth their claims.
At the time Gleitman was decided, the law in New Jersey provided
criminal sanctions for all abortions performed "without lawful justifica-
tion." 25 Although the majority in Gleitman assumed arguendo that a
lawful abortion would have been available somehow or somewhere, they
nevertheless indicated that there was serious doubt as to the legality of
eugenic abortions26 in NewJersey. Against this background, the court con-
cluded that public policy prohibited the recognition of a claim which, in
essence, demanded damages for denial of the opportunity to take an em-
bryonic life.
The true meaning of the Gleitman policy argument lies between the
lines. The court did not wish merely to exalt the value of life. Rather, the
court wanted to avoid expanding the categories of lawful abortions. To
have allowed recovery in Gleitman would have been tantamount to ruling
sub silentio that eugenic abortions were lawful in New Jersey. 27 The ma-
jority strongly insinuated, however, that such abortions were not legal.
20. Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934).
21. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 31, 227 A.2d at 693.
24. Id. at 29-30, 227 A.2d at 693.
25. N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:87-1 (1951).
26. Abortions performed to prevent the birth of an impaired fetus.
27. In certain matters of public policy a court must look only to the statutes
of the forum's state. Thus, even though the Gleitmans may have been able to ob-
tain a lawful abortion elsewhere, the court in Gleitman was constrained to follow
the policy of New Jersey statutes. If the law of New Jersey prohibited eugenic
abortions, it would have been improper to denigrate the policy of the legislature
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Undoubtedly they realized that such language would serve to deter
reputable physicians from performing such abortions. Thus, they were
able to achieve their unspoken purpose of protecting embryonic life,
without reaching the issue whether criminal sanctions would be imposed
on a doctor who performed a eugenic abortion in good faith.
The policy argument of Gleitman has been substantially weakened by
the legalization of abortion. 28 Absent the threat of criminal liability, the
Gleitman policy would have little or no effect upon the number of abor-
tions performed 29 and hence would amount to little more than lip service
favoring child birth over abortion.3 0 The general policy favoring compen-
sation of injured parties should not be set aside in deference to the personal
views of judges.
The second reason given in Gleitman for denying a wrongful birth
cause of action was the problem of measuring damages. Every court which
28. Anti-abortion statues such as the one in New Jersey at the time of
Gleitman have been invalidated by the United States Supreme Court decision in
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). States may not impinge upon a woman's deci-
sion to obtain an abortion absent a compelling state interest. The state's interest
in protecting the child does not become "compelling" until the child is capable of
meaningful life outside the womb. 410 U.S. at 163. This raises several interesting
constitutional questions which are beyond the scope of this note. One such ques-
tion is whether the endorsement of a policy which allows recovery for all types of
malpractice except wrongful birth would constitute an unconstitutional infringe-
ment of the rights of the parties. Two cases have suggested that it would. Troppi
v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1975); Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio
St. 2d 41, 356 N.E.2d 496 (1976). The problem is finding sufficient state action.
See Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 306-12 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring),
which suggests that the denial of a remedy may be state action. In Planned Parent-
hood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) the Court stated that the state did not
have the authority to give a third party the right of veto power over the abortion
decision of a physician and his patient. Reading Planned Parenthood along with
the language of Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 197 (1973), which states that a
woman is entitled to "receive medical care in accordance with her licensed physi-
cian's best judgment," suggests that a state may not relieve a doctor of his duty of
rendering medically sound advice so as to make him a surrogate of the state in
discouraging abortions. See also Colautti v. Franklin, 47 U.S.L.W. 4094 (1979).
29. Denial of a cause of action for wrongful birth would reduce the number
of eugenic abortions only if doctors are thereby encouraged to be negligent, so as
to fail to disclose the risk of defects, or if they are permitted to intentionally
withhold such information. Courts would not consciously wish to encourage
negligence in any aspect of prenatal care as this type of conduct also would
adversely affect the chances of detecting treatable diseases. To permit intentional
concealment of such information, on the other hand, would fly in the face of the
mother's constitutional rights. See note 28 supra. Moreover, the only children
"protected" would be those who were likely to be impaired. The Gleitman policy
would have no effect upon the number of abortions obtained for so-called "soft"
reasons, e.g., simply to control family size or avoid unwed motherhood.
30. The policy of Gleitman is considered inapplicable to cases involving
contraception, as opposed to abortion. Betancourt v. Gaylor, 136 N.J. Super. 69,
344 A.2d 336 (1975), contra, Park v. Chessin, 60 App. Div. 2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d
110, 116 (1977) (Titone, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 44
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has denied recovery for wrongful birth has based its decision to some
degree upon the problem of fixing damages.
Some courts have encountered problems with the question of damages
because of their failure to apply basic damage principles. The normal pro-
cedure in tort cases in which a defendant's act causes injury while also
bestowing a direct benefit is to allow the trier of fact to offset the value of
the benefit against the damages attributable to the injury. 31 By failing to
recognize the applicability of this "benefits rule" to wrongful birth actions,
some courts have denied recovery on the ground that permitting parents to
retain the "benefits" of parenthood while shifting the costs to the doctor
would be wholly out of proportion to the culpability involved and would
place an unreasonable burden upon physicians. 32 While there is nothing
unreasonable about holding a physician liable for the foreseeable conse-
quences of his tortious act, it would be inequitable to allow unjust enrich-
ment of the parents- if they in fact received any "benefit" - at the expense
of the medical profession. Application of the benefits rule, however,
undercuts this objection by allowing the benefit of being "blessed" with a
child to be considered by the trier of fact in assessing damages.
In most wrongful birth cases, as in Gleitman, the courts do recognize
the propriety of offsetting the benefits of parenthood against the so-called
"hard money damages. '3 3 Once the benefits rule is recognized as ap-
plicable, the plaintiffs in wrongful birth cases have then been confronted
with the arguments that there are no damages as a matter of law, 34 or that
damages are too speculative to permit recovery. 35
The argument that there can be no injury by virtue of the birth of a
healthy child may be a reasonable statement of personal values, but it is an
untenable position for the law to take. Judge Levin, writing the opinion of
the court in Troppi v. Scarf, 36 rejected such an argument by stating:
Contraceptives are used to prevent the birth of healthy children.
To say that for reasons of public policy contraceptive failure can
result in no damage as a matter of law ignores the fact that tens of
millions of persons use contraceptives daily to avoid the very result
which the defendant would have us say is always a benefit, never a
detriment. Those tens of millions of persons, by their conduct, ex-
press the sense of the community.37
31. Troppiv. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240,187 N.W.2d 511 (1971); D. DOBBS,
REMEDIES § 3.6 (1973); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 920 (1939).
32. Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (1957); Rieck v. Medical Pro-
tective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974).
33. Damages would include, inter alia, the cost of food, clothing, education
and medical care.
34. Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 927 (1974).
35. E.g., Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975).
36. 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971).
37. Id. at 253, 187 N.W.2d at 517.
1979]
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Although it may be that in some instances the birth of even an unplanned
child will confer so substantial a benefit on the parents as to outweigh the
expense of its birth and care, such should not be made an irrebuttable
presumption of law.
• A few courts have suggested that there can be no recovery for the ex-
pense of rearing a child because the parents could have mitigated or avoid-
ed such damages by placing the child for adoption.38 This ignores the prin-
ciple that recovery is denied only for harm which could be reasonably
avoided.3 9 Once a child is born, there is a strong sense of obligation to see
that the child receives a proper upbringing. The law has long recognized
the special interest of a child in remaining with its natural parents.40 A
tortfeasor is in no position to demand that parents part with a child when
strong social and emotional convictions may compel otherwise.4 1
Moreover, such a policy will inure to the detriment of the child who must
be placed for adoption to avoid the unwanted burden. At best, the tort-
feasor should only be allowed to show that the parents have acted
unreasonably. This is a question for the trier of fact and should not be
grounds for withholding the case from the jury.
Even if it is conceded that damages exist, some courts have never-
theless denied recovery because of the difficulty in measuring damages. 42
This too is a misapplication of basic damage principles. The "certainty
rule" of damages refers to the fact of damages, not to their amount. 43
38. Colemanv. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975); Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa.
D. & C.2d 41 (1957); Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219
N.W.2d 242 (1974).
39. See generally 25 CJ.S. Damages § 33 (1966).
40. See, e.g., Vance v. Vance, 203 S.W.2d 899 (St. L. Mo. App. 1947); 67
C.J.S. Parent and Child § 12 (1950).
41. See Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971):
While the reasonableness of a plaintiff's efforts to mitigate is ordinarily
to be decided by the trier of fact, we are persuaded to rule, as a matter of
law, that no mother, wed or unwed, can reasonably be required to abort
(even if legal) or place her child for adoption.
Id. at 260, 187 N.W.2d at 520.
42. Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975); Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49
NJ. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967); Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Ct. App.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927 (1974).
43. See, e.g., City of Kennett v. Katz Constr. Co., 273 Mo. 279, 202 S.W.
558 (1918):
[I]n applying the rule against the recovery of uncertain damages, it is the
uncertainty as to their nature and not as to their measure or extent that is
meant.... The manner of measuring the damages having been ascer-
tained, impossibilities in proving same are not required, but only that
the best evidence be adduced, of which the nature of the case is capable;
in other words, the degree of certainty of proof is dependent upon the
character of the proceeding.
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When parents have an unplanned child they incur such damages as the
cost of rearing the child, medical expenses, and loss of the wife's services.
The mere fact that the defendant is entitled to have the value of the benefit
to the parents offset against the damages does not make these damages
uncertain. Even though in some cases the value of the benefit conferred
may totally offset the damages for the injury inflicted, this is no basis for a
nonsuit. The value of the benefit conferred is a question for the trier of
fact, hence it is improper to consider this value in ruling on a motion to
dismiss or a motion for a directed verdict.44 Moreover, the determination
of net damage should not be an insurmountable task; juries deal with in-
tangible damages every day. The argument that the "complex human
benefits of motherhood and fatherhood" are immeasurable is wholly
unpersuasive, especially in light of the fact that in several jurisdictions such
damages are recoverable for the wrongful death of a child. 45
In addition to the two primary arguments against allowing recovery for
wrongful birth, Rieck v. Medical Protective Co. 46 has interposed two addi-
tional arguments: the risk of fraudulent claims and the belief that the
recognition of a wrongful birth cause of action would place an
unreasonable burden upon the medical profession.
The fear of fraudulent claims is unrealistic in many situations in which
wrongful birth claims arise.47 Moreover, the notion that bona fide claims
should be denied because of the possibility of fraudulent claims is in-
dicative of a lack of faith in the jury system. 48 Park flatly rejected this argu-
ment and expressed its faith in thejudiciary's ability to "sift the wheat from
the chaff."49
As for the burden upon the medical profession, the courts have failed
to disclose what social policy would be furthered by immunizing doctors
44. See Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 257; 187 N.W.2d 511, 519
(1971).
45. See Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 485, § 6 (1950).
46. 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974). See also Park v. Chessin, 60
App. Div. 2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110, 118 (1977) (Titone, J., dissenting).
47. Rieck involved a doctor's failure to correctly diagnose the plaintiffs con-
dition as pregnancy. By the time a correct diagnosis was obtained, plaintiff con-
tended that it was too late to abort. The court undoubtedly realized that there
was a substantial likelihood that, having been given the opportunity to decide,
the parents may have changed their minds and allowed the child to be born.
However, in situations where an abortion would have been sought because of the
strong likelihood of defects, the probability that the parents would have aborted
is much greater. Absent the showing of strong religious considerations, it might
be presumed that an abortion would be obtained where grievous defects are like-
ly.
48. See, e.g., Steggal v. Morris, 363 Mo. 1224, 258 S.W.2d 577 (En Banc
1953). The difficulty plaintiff may have in proving his case and the risk that the
cause of action may at times give rise to fraudulent claims are not sufficient
reasons for denying a cause of action. "If a plaintiff cannot prove his case, no
judgment will be permitted to stand." Id. at 1231, 258 S.W.2d at 580.
49. 88 Misc. 2d at 232, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 211.
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from some aspects of liability for their tortious conduct. Tort immunity
should be granted only where there are overriding social interests. There
does not appear to be any valid basis for granting preferential treatment to
the medical profession over other professions in which malpractice can
result in liability for damages.A0
Although much has been said about why recovery should be denied,
little has been said about the rights to be protected. When a patient con-
sults her physician, the physician is required to conform to the standard of
care generally exercised by the members of his profession. This is true
whether the physician is rendering care or merely giving advice.A1 If the
doctor fails to exercise the required degree of care and as a result an
unplanned child is born, the question is simply who should bear the
resulting loss. The costs of raising a child can be a heavy burden. The
allocation of resources function of tort law is just as applicable to wrongful
birth as to any other tort. To the extent that tort law encourages conformity
with the standard of care imposed, the general societal interest in proper
medical care also will be furthered. It is the emotional connotations of
family planning that have been the major bar to wrongful birth actions,
rather than sound legal principles. The more recent cases, however, show
an increasing tendency to treat wrongful birth as just another tort claim. 2
In considering the wrongful life type of action, one is first confronted
by the fact that, unlike wrongful birth, there is nothing which even
remotely resembles a trend toward the recognition of a wrongful life cause
of action. Prior to Park, eleven cases involving wrongful life had made
their way into the courts, and in each of these cases recovery was denied. 3
50. Id. at 231-32, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 211.
51. See, e.g., Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668, 673 (Mo. 1965). The rela-
tionship between a doctor and patient is one of trust and confidence; the doctor is
thus required to disclose such information as is in the patient's best interests to
know. Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 501 (1973).
52. See cases cited note 19 supra.
53. Smith v. United States, 392 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Ohio 1975); Stills v.
Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976); Pinkey v. Pinkey, 198
So. 2d 52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967), overruled on other grounds, 300 So. 2d 668
(Fla. 1974); Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964); Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689
(1967); Johnson v. Yeshiva Univ., 42 N.Y.2d 818, 364 N.E.2d 1340, 396
N.Y.S.2d 647 (1977) (court affirmed dismissal upon the grounds that no issue of
negligence existed for the jury); Williams v. State, 18 N.Y.2d 481, 223 N.E.2d
343, 276 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1966); Karlsons v. Guerinot, 57 App. Div. 2d 73, 394
N.Y.S.2d 933 (1977); Stewart v. Long Island College Hosp., 35 App. Div. 2d 531,
313 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1970), appeal dismissed mem., 27 N.Y.2d 804, 264 N.E.2d
354, 315 N.Y.S.2d 863 (1970) (implicitly overruled by Park); Dumer v. Saint
Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975); Slawek v. Stroh, 62
Wis. 2d 295, 215 N.W.2d 9 (1974); Annot., 83 A.L.R.3d 15 (1978). See, e.g.,
Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), cert. denied, 379
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Park is the first appellate level court to uphold a wrongful life cause of
action.
There are basically two types of wrongful life cases. One type is the so-
called "bastard cases," which involve children born out of wedlock who
claim injury by virtue of their illegitimate status. The fact situations under
which these cases arise make them very poor vehicles through which to
argue for the creation of a new cause of action. 54 Unfortunately the first
two wrongful life cases were bastard cases. 55
The second type of wrongful life cases are those which involve children
born with serious mental or physical defects. 56 At present, only physicians
have been defendants in these lawsuits. The basis of the complaint in this
type of wrongful life case is that the doctor's negligence prevented the
mother from exercising her judgment, on behalf of the child, to avoid con-
ception or to abort.
In various opinions dealing with wrongful life, the courts have ar-
ticulated four general bases for denying the wrongful life cause of action:
(1) the cause of action would have wide ranging social ramifications, 7 (2)
social policy, 58 (3) lack of damages, 59 and (4) immeasurability of
damages. 60 Each of these arguments will be examined, along with the cases
which pronounced them.
54. These cases have all been suits against the father. Undoubtedly they are
spurred by the bastards' limited statutory rights to support, and perhaps as acts of
reprisal by the disgruntled mothers.
55. Although the term "wrongful life" had its origin in a bastard case,
Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 945 (1964), most bastard cases are not true wrongful life actions. The
essence of a wrongful life claim is that the child must be born, if at all, under some
type of disadvantage. The bastard cases typically do not fall within this definition
because the parents could have legitimated the child by subsequently marrying.
The Zepeda case itself arguably meets the test because the putative father was
already married, and hence unable to have legitimated the child.
56. See, e.g., Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
57. See, e.g., Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849(1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964).
58. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 18 N.Y.2d 481, 223 N.E.2d 343, 276
N.Y.S.2d 885 (1966).
59. See, e.g., Karlsons v. Guerinot, 57 App. Div. 2d 73, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933(1977). The decision in Park is directly contrary to Karlons. Karlsons relied upon
the decision in Williams v. State, 18 N.Y.2d 481, 223 N.E.2d 343, 276 N.Y.S.2d
885 (1966), which held that a bastard child did not state a cause of action against
a state mental hospital for the hospital's negligence in permitting a sexual assault
uponthe child's mentally deficient mother, the act of which led to the child's
birth. Park, however, relied upon dictum in Howard v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109,
366 N.E.2d 64, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1977), which expressed the view that the ques-
tion of recovery by an impaired child was still open in New York.
60. See, e.g., Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
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In Zepeda v. Zepeda, 61 a bastard child brought suit against his father
claiming injury by virtue of his illegitimate status. The court concluded
that the father's fraudulent promises of marriage, made to the plaintiff's
mother for the purpose of inducing sexual relations, were tortious as to the
child. Notwithstanding the court's conclusion that the child had been in-
jured by the tortious acts of the father, the court refused to recognize the
cause of action. 62
After noting the large number of illegitimate births each year, the
court expressed the fear that recognizing a cause of action for wrongful life
would not only give rise to a flood of suits by illegitimates, it also would en-
courage suits by all the other children in the world who, for one reason or
another, were unhappy with the conditions under which they were born.
Encouraging such suits by children against their parents, the court con-
cluded, would have wide ranging social consequences which were not
proper subjects for judicial lawmaking.
The problems raised by the Zepeda case are applicable only if the
wrongful life cause of action is directed towards a parent. If the cause of
action is limited to the acts of third parties, there is no basis for the ap-
prehension of such ramifications. Wrongful life claims, like any other tort,
would come into play only when the third party breached a traditionally
recognized duty. These cases typically would involve a physician who
negligently failed to warn a prospective mother of the risk of birth defects.
Limiting the cause of action to claims against third parties would not
require senseless distinctions. There are good reasons for denying a child a
cause of action against his parents. Many states would dispose of such
claims by the application of the doctrine of parental immunity.63 Much of
the reasoning that supports this doctrine is just as applicable to wrongful
life cases as to any other tort. Preservation of family harmony and protec-
tion of family assets are valid grounds for distinguishing suits by children
against their parents from suits against third parties.
There are also other reasons for immunizing parents that are unique to
wrongful life cases. One such reason is the nature of the decisions involved.
The choice to procreate is one which is pervaded by deep seated moral and
religious convictions. 64 It is quite unlike a doctor's duty of disclosure,
61. 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945
(1964).
62. The willingness of the court to admit that the acts were tortious in
nature and wrongful as to the child brought about a flurry of law review specula-
tion and criticism. See, e.g., 1963 U. ILL. L. F. 733 (1963); 49 IowA L. REv. 1005
(1964).
63. For a discussion of the doctrine of parental immunity see MacDonald,
Torts-Parental Immunity Doctrine in Missouri, 38 Mo. L. REv. 699 (1973).
64. The Supreme Court has recognized the fundamental nature of the deci-
sion to procreate on numerous occasions. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431
U.S. 678, 685 (1977) ("decision whether or not to beget or bear a child is at the
178 [Vol. 44.
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which is detached from any moral or religious considerations. It is not irra-
tional to protect the parents in their choice to bear a child in spite of the
risk of defects, yet hold a physician liable for failure to disclose such risks.
The nature of the parents' choice makes subjecting it to second guessing by
a jury improper.
A related reason for distinguishing between actions against third par-
ties and actions against parents is that it may be in the best interest of the
unborn child not to have a right to a cause of action against his parents. A
woman has a virtually unbridled right to abort a child during the first
trimester of pregnancy. Maternal love is the unborn's only sustenance dur-
ing this period. The law should not risk severing this tenuous hold on life
by, in essence, making the child a cause of action waiting to mature. If a
mother is told that there is a ten percent chance her child will be seriously
defective, she may nevertheless be willing to take the risk. If in addition the
law threatened to subject her decision to review by a jury, she may'feel con-
strained to abort a life she might otherwise have preserved.
Although the state should not impede a mother's decision to abort, it is
wholly permissible to refrain from creating a cause of action which could
encourage abortions. The choice to abort, as a part of a woman's right to
privacy, should be a free choice, not a compelled one.
The application of rational social policies could enable courts to limit
wrongful life actions to third party defendants who have breached a tradi-
tionally recognized duty. There is no reason to fear that a wrongful life
cause of action, so limited, would have the far ranging social consequences
feared by the majority in Zepeda.
In another early bastard case, Williams v. State, 61 an infant who was
born out of wedlock to a mentally deficient mother as a result of a sexual
assault upon the mother while she was confined as a patient in a state men-
tal institution filed a claim against the state for negligently failing to pre-
vent the assault. The court conceded that the allegations of the complaint,
if true, indicated grievous neglect on the part of the state, but denied
recovery because "the policy and social reasons against providing such
compensation are at least as strong as those which might be thought to
favor it."66 However, the court did not articulate what the social policies
were which favored either the state's breach of duty or its immunization
from liability. Holding a third party liable for the results of his failure to
comply with the standard of care required by law appears to further social
policy, rather than contravene it.
very heart of this cluster of constitutionally protected choices"); Planned Paren-
thood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Roev. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doev.
Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
65. 18 N.Y.2d 481, 223 N.E.2d 343, 276 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1966).
66. Id. at 484, 223 N.E.2d at 344, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 887.
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Although the policy argument of Williams and the fear of vast
ramifications expressed in Zepeda have been parroted in subsequent deci-
sions, the principal impediment of the wrongful life cause of action is the
question of damages. In Karlsons v. Guerinot67 the parents of a mongoloid
child filed a suit on her behalf claiming that the defendant obstetrician
had failed to inform her mother of the risks of birth defects, thereby
preventing the mother from making an informed choice to terminate the
pregnancy. In denying the wrongful life cause of action, the court stated
that in order to recognize the infant's cause of action, the court would have
to find that she had been injured by the defendant's negligence, i.e., that
life with deformities, however severe, is worse than "the utter void of
nonexistence.1 6 This value judgment was considered beyond the scope of
judicial decisionmaking. The effect of the Karlsons decision is to create an
irrebuttable presumption that existence, no matter how onerous, is
preferable to nonexistence or nonbirth.
Karlsons and other cases which speak of "famous persons who have had
great achievement despite physical defects"6 9 obviously are only consider-
ing those children born with limited defects.70 The Park child never had a
chance to experience any of the pleasures which presumably make a tem-
poral existence worthwhile. Other cases have involved equally pathetic im-
pairments. 7' There is no more basis to say that the value of life always
outweighs the costs of life with suffering than to say that the value of a
child to a parent always outweighs the cost of rearing the child. 72 If this
presumption is based on public policy, then the courts have as yet failed to
articulate a valid basis for such a policy.
67. 57 App. Div. 2d 73, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933 (1977). See note 59 supra poin-
ting out the conflict among the New York decisions.
68. Id. at 81, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933, 938 (1977) (quoting Gleitmanv. Cosgrove,
49 NJ. 22, 28, 227 A.2d 689, 692).
69. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 NJ. 22, 30, 227 A.2d 689, 693 (1967).
70. See Note, A Cause of Action for "Wrongful Life". [A Suggested
Analysis], 55 MINN. L. REV. 58, 65-66.(1970).
71. See, e.g., Comment, Howard v. Lecher, An Unreasonable Limitation
on a Physician's Liability in a Wrongful Life Suit, 12 NEW ENGLAND L. REV.
819, 829 n. 73 (1977). The author describes the tragic course of Tay-Sachs
disease. Although the Howard case did not involve a claim on behalf of the child,
the facts of the case clearly suggest the invalidity of the argument that life is
always preferable to nonexistence.
72. Undoubtedly at some point the agony of existence would outweigh the
benefit. Moreover, as the impairment increased, the value of life seemingly would
decline correspondingly. The Park child is a good example. On the one hand, she
suffered substantial pain and mental torment; to offset that, she was "alive."
However, breathing alone hardly would constitute a benefit. It seems implicit in
the "right to die" cases such as In re Quinlan, 70 NJ. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976),
that at some point reasonable men would conclude that "life" was no longer
worth clinging to. Courts have been reluctant to recognize a right to die, but the
reasons for denying the existence of a right to die are not present in wrongful life
cases. See Note, The Right to Die a Natural Death: A Discussion of In re Quinlan
[Vol. 44
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In addition to the argument that as a matter of law there can be no
damages for wrongful life, some courts have refused to recognize wrongful
life claims because of the difficulty of ascertaining damages. 73 Much of this
problem has been caused by the misapprehension of the courts that the
child is seeking damages for life itself. 74 In the Park case, the court correct-
ly noted that the child "does not seek damages for being born, per se, but
rather seeks damages for the pain suffered by her after her birth."75
The conceptual problem arises because, by definition, wrongful life
claims arise only where there is no alternative to being born defective,
other than not being born at all. This does not, however, alter the fact that
the child has suffered injury by virtue of her conscious pain and suffering.
As discussed earlier, a single act can result in both a benefit and an
injury.76 This is what occurs in a wrongful life fact situation. Unques-
tionably the Park child was injured, but at the same time the negligent act
also conferred whatever benefit accrued to the child by virtue of her birth.
If the "benefits rule" is applied, the defendant should be permitted to
offset damages by showing that his negligent act conferred a benefit upon
the plaintiff. The burden of producing evidence of the nature of such
benefit is upon the defendant. 77 In essence, the defendant must attempt to
show the extent to which the plaintiff will be capable of living a mean-
ingful life. The jury may then take such benefit into consideration in set-
ting the measure of damages. Ascertaining the value of such benefit would
and the California Natural Death Act, 46 CIN. L. REv. 192, 196 (1977). The
choice whether a child should be born with defects belongs to the parents, "[i]f
one objects to awarding damages for the violation of this right, it would seem that
the objection is directed either at the policy of allowing abortions... or at giving
parents who may have conflicting motivations the authority to make this
decision." Capron, Informed Decision Making in Genetic Counseling: A Dissent
to the "Wrongful Life" Debate, 48 IND. L.J. 581, 598 (1973). Physicians would
not be induced to abort "borderline fetuses" if their duty was limited to full
disclosure. Friedman, Legal Implications of Amniocentesis, 123 U. PA. L. REV.
92, 154 (1974).
73. Despite the fact that this is often cited as a justification for denying
recovery, the courts have not clearly indicated whether they are referring to the
existence of damages, or merely to their measure. See Smith v. United States,
392 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Ohio 1975); Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d
689 (1967); Stewart v. Long Island College Hosp., 35 App. Div. 2d 531, 313
N.Y.S.2d 502 (1970), appeal dismissed mem., 27 N.Y.2d 804, 264 N.E.2d 354,
315 N.Y.S.2d 863 (1970); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233
N.W.2d 372 (1975).
74. Karlsons v. Guerinot, 57 App. Div. 2d 73, 80, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933, 937
(1977).
75. 88 Misc. 2d at 229, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 209.
76. See text accompanying note 31 supra.
77. It is a generally recognized principal of law that the defendant has the
burden of proving any items of mitigation or reduction of damages. See generally
Annot., 134 A.L.R. 242 (1941).
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not seem impossible, as juries make similar determinations in jurisdictions
which permit recovery for the loss of enjoyment of life.78 As the Park court
stated, ultimately the measure of damages should be a pragmatic deter-
mination by the trier of fact, after hearing all of the evidence.79
Even assuming the valuation of such benefits is beyond the ability of
juries, the benefits rule is an equitable doctrine designed to prevent the un-
just enrichment of a plaintiff whenever it is equitable to do so.80 It would
be a perversion of the benefits rule to utilize it to deny a plaintiff s recovery
because the defendant cannot prove the value of the benefit he has confer-
red.81
"Decisional law must keep pace with expanding technological,
economic and social change."8 2 Reliable birth control methods are rather
recent, and abortions were illegal in most states less than a decade ago.
Parents have increasing ability to control procreation, and with these
growing rights and abilities must come liability for those who negligently
thwart family plans. The growth of the wrongful birth cause of action
should fill this need.
However, in many cases it is not enough to compensate only the
parents, for their duty to care for the child ceases at majority. Park has
taken the first step in providing complete relief through the recognition of
both wrongful birth and wrongful life actions. Even though Zepeda may
have been correct in deferring to the legislature on the issue whether a
child should be permitted to sue his parents for wrongful life, claims
against third parties stand on a different footing. There is no persuasive
reason for judicial abdication in wrongful life cases when a third party is
the defendant.
The law is well settled that parents have the right to choose the medical
treatment their children receive. 3 It is incumbent upon the courts to
78. A number of courts have recognized that the loss of enjoyment of life is
an element of damages separate and distinct from pain and suffering. See
Annot., 15 A.L.R.3d 506 (1967).
79. 88 Misc. 2d at 232, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 211.
80. The mitigation of damages is an equitable principle. Taylor v. Ford
Motor Co., 392 F. Supp. 254 (W.D. Mo. 1974). Hence equitable considerations
apply to whether the defendant may offset the value of any benefit conferred.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 920 (1939).
81. See Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Harbison, 99 Tex. 536 (1906). In an action for
damages caused by overflows, the defendant was not entitled to show that the
overflow had carried rich soil onto plaintiffs land without proving that the value
of the land was enhanced by such deposits. See generally 25 C.J.S. Damages § 96
(1966).
82. Park v. Chessin, 60 App. Div. 2d at 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 114.
83. 59 AM.JUR. 2d Parent and Child § 15 (1971). This right is subject only to
the state's power to intervene if the parent acts unreasonably. When abortions are
involved, however, the state has no right to intervene. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973). Seemingly the choice of whether an impaired child should be born is
under the absolute control of the parents.
[Vol. 44
16
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 1 [1979], Art. 15
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss1/15
1979] RECENT CASES 183
recognize that, at least for the present, abortion is the only "cure" for many
genetic defects. A doctor's negligence which prevents the parents from ex-
ercising their judgment on behalf of their child should result in liability in
wrongful life cases, just as in any other malpractice suit. The choice to
abort is primarily the mother's. To the extent she is deprived of her right to
act for her unborn child, there should be a remedy if the interference in-
ures to the child's detriment.84
WILBUR L. TOMLINSON
84. The decision in Park appears to be based on this line of reasoning. The
language of the opinion suggests that the child's claim is in a sense derivative of
the mother's right to choose. 60 App. Div. 2d at 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 114.
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